Ambiguity and Deterrence

Ambiguity and Deterrence

EnglishHardbackPrint on demand
Baylis John
Oxford University Press
EAN: 9780198280125
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Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, it is argued that the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These disagreements centred on six main questions: whether deterrence was best achieved through `punishment' or `denial'; whether deterrence necessitated nuclear superiority; whether preparations had to be made for a long war or a short war; what strategic implications followed from nuclear stalemate; whether limited nuclear wars could be fought without escalation to all-out nuclear war; and whether pre-emption was politically acceptable and militarily necessary. It is argued that the failure of successive governments to provide clear political direction on these issues meant that British nuclear strategy was more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.
EAN 9780198280125
ISBN 0198280122
Binding Hardback
Publisher Oxford University Press
Publication date December 28, 1995
Pages 512
Language English
Dimensions 224 x 145 x 34
Country United Kingdom
Authors Baylis John
Series Nuclear History Program